Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information

Philip Reny ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, vol. 59, issue 2, 257-274

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(83)71017-3
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:59:y:1993:i:2:p:257-274

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().