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Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information

Philip Reny ()

Levine's Working Paper Archive from David K. Levine

Date: 2010-12-10
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Journal Article: Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information (1993) Downloads
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