Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game

Klaus Schmidt ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, vol. 60, issue 1, 114-139

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(83)71037-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game (2010)
Working Paper: Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:60:y:1993:i:1:p:114-139

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().