Heski Bar-Isaac () and
Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, vol. 136, issue 3, 695-717
Blockholders play a large role in corporate governance. We examine their voting behavior by adding a voter with many votes, i.e., a blockholder, to a standard voting model. A blockholder may not vote with all of her shares. This is efficient because it prevents her from drowning out the information in others’ votes. This effect holds even when shares may be traded. Consequently, regulations prohibiting abstention will harm information aggregation, though such regulations may promote information acquisition by blockholders. We extend the model by allowing: the blockholder to announce her information upfront, the possibility of blockholder bias, and asymmetric priors.
Keywords: Blockholder; Shareholder voting; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Blockholder Voting (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:136:y:2020:i:3:p:695-717
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