Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of foreign entry liberalization

Anusha Chari and Nandini Gupta

Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, vol. 88, issue 3, 633-656

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of incumbent firms on the decision to allow foreign direct investment into an industry. Using data from India's economic reforms, the results show that firms in concentrated industries are more successful at preventing foreign entry, state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than privately-owned firms, and profitable state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than unprofitable state-owned firms. The pattern of foreign entry liberalization supports the private interest view of policy implementation and suggests that it may be necessary to reduce the influence of state-owned firms to optimally enact reforms.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:88:y:2008:i:3:p:633-656

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