Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

Rui Albuquerque and Enrique Schroth

Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, vol. 96, issue 1, 33-55

Abstract: We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premiums and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block premium or discount depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. We find evidence of large private benefits of control and of associated deadweight losses, but also of value creation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis.

Keywords: Block; pricing; Control; transactions; Private; benefits; of; control; Structural; estimation; Deadweight; loss (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Working Paper: Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:96:y:2010:i:1:p:33-55

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