Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

Rui Albuquerque and Enrique Schroth (enrique.schroth@edhec.edu)

No 7358, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premia and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block premium or discount depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. We find evidence of large private benefits of control and of associated deadweight losses, but also of value creation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis.

Keywords: Block pricing; Block trades; Control transactions; Deadweight loss; Private benefits of control; Structural estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G18 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades (2010)
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