Do firm–bank ‘odd couples’ exacerbate credit rationing?

Giovanni Ferri and Pierluigi Murro

Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2015, vol. 24, issue 2, 231-251

Abstract: This paper tests the impact of an imperfect firm–bank type match on firms’ financial constraints using a dataset of about 4500 Italian manufacturing firms. Considering an optimal match of opaque (transparent) borrowing firms with relational (transactional) lending main banks, the possibility arises of firm–bank “odd couples” where opaque firms end up matched with transactional main banks. We show that the probability of credit rationing increases when the mismatch between firms and banks widens. Our conjecture is that “odd couples” emerge either because of organizational changes in the credit market or since firms observe only imperfectly banks’ lending technology.

Keywords: Bank–firm relationships; Asymmetric information; Credit rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S104295731400059X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Do Firm-Bank ``Odd Couples'' Exacerbate Credit Rationing? (2012)
Working Paper: Do Firm-Bank `Odd Couples' Exacerbate Credit Rationing? (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:24:y:2015:i:2:p:231-251

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2014.09.002

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Intermediation is currently edited by Elu von Thadden

More articles in Journal of Financial Intermediation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().