Do Firm-Bank `Odd Couples' Exacerbate Credit Rationing?
Pierluigi Murro () and
Additional contact information
Zeno Rotondi: UniCredit Group's Retail Research Division
No 31, SERIES from Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro"
We start considering an optimal matching of opaque (transparent) borrowing firrms with relational (transactional) lending main banks. Next we contemplate the possibility that firm-bank "odd couples" materialize where opaque (transparent) firrms end up matched with transactional (re- lational) main banks. We conjecture the "odd couples" emerge either since the bank's lending technology is not perfectly observable to the rm or because riskier firrms - even though opaque - strategically select transac- tional banks in the hope of being classified as lower risks. Our econometric results show the probability of rationing is larger when firrms and banks match in "odd couples".
Keywords: Relationship Banking; Credit Rationing and Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07, Revised 2010-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Do firm–bank ‘odd couples’ exacerbate credit rationing? (2015)
Working Paper: Do Firm-Bank ``Odd Couples'' Exacerbate Credit Rationing? (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bai:series:economia-series31
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in SERIES from Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro" Largo Abbazia S. Scolastica, 53 - 70124 - Bari - ITALY. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Girolamo Sgherza Sgherza (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .