 Incentives for cattle producers to adopt an E. Coli vaccine: An application of best–worst scalingOchieng’, Brian J. and Jill Hobbs Food Policy, 2016, vol. 59, issue C, 78-87 Abstract: E. coli O157:H7 is an important source of foodborne disease. The E. coli pathogen occurs naturally within the rumen of livestock (including cattle) and does not affect the health of the cattle, however, can be a source of cross-contamination during food processing or environmental contamination of drinking and irrigation water supplies. A vaccine to reduce the risk of cattle shedding E. coli is licensed for use in Canada and the US, however, adoption of the vaccine by cattle producers has been extremely low. Using data from a survey of cow–calf producers in western Canada, the influence of a set of thirteen incentives to encourage adoption of the vaccine is examined using Best–Worst Scaling. Incentives include policy interventions, market/supply chain incentives, production protocol incentives, and producer reputation incentives. Heterogeneity in producer responses to the incentives is evident and is further explored with a Latent Class Cluster analysis. Results suggest that a ‘one size fits all’ policy to encourage adoption of an E. coli vaccine by cattle producers may be challenging. Keywords: Best–Worst Scaling; E. coli; Technology adoption; Cow–calf producer; Food safety; Latent class clusters (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfpoli:v:59:y:2016:i:c:p:78-87 DOI: 10.1016/j.foodpol.2015.12.004 Access Statistics for this article Food Policy is currently edited by J. Kydd More articles in Food Policy from Elsevier |
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