Viewpoint: Is the ban on deception necessary or even desirable?

David Just

Food Policy, 2019, vol. 83, issue C, 5-6

Abstract: Deception has long been barred from the mainstream experimental economics literature based upon worries that any deception could pollute the participant pool, leading most participants to suspect that researchers are potentially lying about the incentives they face. Nonetheless, debates regarding the definition and acceptability of deception in experimental economics are common. Experimental psychologists have long employed deception as an essential part of their methodology and have studied the impacts of deception on participants in subsequent experiments. I propose the use of experimental economics to determine the impacts of deception, using empirical evidence to guide research norms and practice.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfpoli:v:83:y:2019:i:c:p:5-6

DOI: 10.1016/j.foodpol.2018.12.010

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