Hips and hearts: The variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures

Denise Doiron (), Denzil Fiebig and Agne Suziedelyte

Journal of Health Economics, 2014, vol. 37, issue C, 81-97

Abstract: The separate identification of effects due to incentives, selection and preference heterogeneity in insurance markets is the topic of much debate. In this paper, we investigate the presence and variation in moral hazard across health care procedures. The key motivating hypothesis is the expectation of larger causal effects in the case of more discretionary procedures. The empirical approach relies on an extremely rich and extensive dataset constructed by linking survey data to administrative data for hospital medical records. Using this approach we are able to provide credible evidence of large moral hazard effects but for elective surgeries only.

Keywords: Health insurance; Asymmetric information; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I11 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629614000861
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Hips and hearts: the variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:81-97

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.06.006

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Health Economics is currently edited by J. P. Newhouse, A. J. Culyer, R. Frank, K. Claxton and T. McGuire

More articles in Journal of Health Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().