Hips and hearts: the variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures

Denise Doiron (), Denzil Fiebig and Agne Suziedelyte

No 2013-14, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: The separate identification of effects due to incentives, selection and preference heterogeneity in insurance markets is the topic of much debate. In this paper, we investigate the presence and variation in moral hazard across health care procedures. The key motivating hypothesis is the expectation of larger causal effects in the case of more discretionary procedures. The empirical approach relies on an extremely rich and extensive dataset constructed by linking survey data to administrative data for hospital medical records. Using this approach we are able to provide credible evidence of large moral hazard effects but for elective surgeries only.

Keywords: health insurance; asymmetric information; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I11 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2013-14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Hips and hearts: The variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hongyi Li ().