Activation against absenteeism – Evidence from a sickness insurance reform in Norway
Journal of Health Economics, 2018, vol. 62, issue C, 60-68
I evaluate a program aimed at strictly enforcing a requirement that people on long-term sick leave be partly back at work unless explicitly defined as an exception. Employing the synthetic control method, I find that the reform reduced work-hours lost due to sickness absenteeism by 12% in the reform region compared to a comparison unit created by a weighted average of similar regions. The effect is driven by both increased part-time presence of temporary disabled workers and accelerated recovery. Musculoskeletal disorders was the diagnosis group declining the most. The findings imply large savings in social security expenditures.
Keywords: Absenteeism; Disability; Activation; Workfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 I38 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:62:y:2018:i:c:p:60-68
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