Activation against Absenteeism: Evidence from a Sickness Insurance Reform in Norway
No 10991, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
I evaluate a program aimed at strictly enforcing a requirement that people on long-term sick leave be partly back at work unless explicitly defined as an exception. Employing the synthetic control method, I find that the reform reduced work-hours lost due to absenteeism by 12 % in the reform region compared to a comparison unit created by a weighted average of similar regions. The effect is driven by both increased part-time presence of temporary disabled workers and accelerated recovery. Musculoskeletal disorders was the diagnosis group declining the most. The findings imply large savings in social security expenditures.
Keywords: absenteeism; disability; activation; forkfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 I38 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-lma
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Journal Article: Activation against absenteeism – Evidence from a sickness insurance reform in Norway (2018)
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