The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

Paulo Júlio

Journal of Macroeconomics, 2014, vol. 42, issue C, 263-280

Abstract: We consider a setup where lobbyist firms undertake contributions to an office-motivated policy maker in exchange for profit increasing regulations, in a general equilibrium model of R&D-driven growth. We find that, despite increasing concentration—which leads to higher prices and less varieties—lobbying may stimulate growth and increase welfare by means of an expansion in aggregate demand if its real costs are small. This conclusion is supported by a simple calibration exercise.

Keywords: Lobbying; Market structure; R&D investment; Growth; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Politics of Growth: Can Lobbying Raise Growth and Welfare? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:42:y:2014:i:c:p:263-280

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2014.08.007

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