Extremely difficult negotiator goals: Do they follow the predictions of goal-setting theory?

Edward W. Miles and Elizabeth F. Clenney

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2012, vol. 118, issue 2, 108-115

Abstract: Traditional goal-setting theory has been applied extensively in negotiation research. We examine one of the major tenets of the theory that has yet to be tested in the negotiation context, the argument that goals that are challenging yet attainable result in optimal performance. Specifically, we test whether goals set substantially beyond challenging yet attainable result in either plateaued or decreased objective negotiation outcomes. Across two studies, our results indicate that goals that are extremely difficult, beyond the challenging yet attainable level set forth in goal-setting theory, produce greater negotiated outcomes. We propose that this effect occurs because of the counter-intuitive notion that negotiators possessing insufficient information have a key advantage over well-informed negotiators.

Keywords: Negotiation; Negotiation goals; Extremely difficult goals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:118:y:2012:i:2:p:108-115

DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.02.001

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