Tainted nudge
Despoina Alempaki,
Andrea Isoni and
Daniel Read
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2023, vol. 176, issue C
Abstract:
Nudges are increasingly used by governments and organizations to promote behaviors like healthy eating or effective financial planning. Due to their cost-effectiveness, such nudges may earn a profit for the nudger. We investigate whether this profit taints nudges, as suggested by recent research showing that altruistic acts can be regarded less favourably if they result in private benefits to the actor. Across seven preregistered experiments, we demonstrate that prosocial nudges are indeed rated less positively if a profit is earned. But this tainting is limited: prosocial but profitable nudges are evaluated much more favourably than merely profitable ones, unless profit-motivated nudgers deceptively claim their motive is prosocial. Our findings apply to both for-profit and non-profit organizations and provide behaviorally informed guidelines for the introduction of nudge interventions. We suggest organizations can avoid the potential risk of backlash by openly disclosing the win–win nature of their prosocial nudges.
Keywords: Nudges; Win–win initiatives; Profit; Prosocial actions; Deception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749597823000195
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:176:y:2023:i:c:s0749597823000195
DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2023.104244
Access Statistics for this article
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes is currently edited by John M. Schaubroeck
More articles in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().