Fostering trust: When the rhetoric of sharing can backfire
Simona Cicognani,
Giorgia Romagnoli and
Ivan Soraperra
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2024, vol. 102, issue C
Abstract:
The peer-to-peer lending and transfer of underutilized resources – the so-called Sharing Economy – make up for a sizeable and rapidly increasing portion of the economy. The digital platforms that enable it have the primary goal of promoting trust among users and providers. In an online experiment, we study how the platform’s revenue model (No-profit vs. For-profit) interacts with its communication strategy in shaping trust. In particular, we consider two communication strategies, one highlighting the trust dimension and the other highlighting the interaction’s profitability. We show how these strategies can affect trust differently for pure-sharing and market-oriented for-profit platforms. We observe that a communication strategy that evokes trust feelings, if sent by a for-profit platform, decreases trust in the interaction. This evidence suggests that leveraging a rhetoric of trust can backfire for profit-oriented platforms in terms of trust generation.
Keywords: Trust game; Sharing economy; Framing; Communication; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D84 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000369
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:102:y:2024:i:c:s0167487024000369
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102728
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Psychology is currently edited by G. Antonides and D. Read
More articles in Journal of Economic Psychology from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().