Monitoring optimistic agents

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Jean-Louis Rullière () and Isabelle Vialle

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2008, vol. 29, issue 5, 698-714

Abstract: Monitoring is typically included in economic models of crime thanks to a probability of detection, constant across individuals. We build on recent results in psychology to argue that comparative optimism deeply affects this standard relation. To this matter, we introduce an experiment involving proper incentives that allow a measurement of optimism bias. Our experiments support the relevance of so-called comparative optimism in decision under risk. In the context of illegal activities, our results provide a guide into costless devices to undermine fraud, through well-designed information campaigns.

Keywords: Optimism; Risk; aversion; Monitoring; design; Illegal; activity; Experimental; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Monitoring optimistic agents (2008)
Working Paper: Monitoring optimistic agents (2008)
Working Paper: Monitoring optimistic agents (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:29:y:2008:i:5:p:698-714

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