Effects of exclusion on acceptance in ultimatum games

Sven Fischer and Werner Güth ()

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2012, vol. 33, issue 6, 1100-1114

Abstract: In three-party ultimatum games, the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, which increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects responder behavior.

Keywords: Exclusion; Bargaining; Ultimatum game; Social preferences; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:33:y:2012:i:6:p:1100-1114

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.07.009

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