Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game

Uta K. Schier, Axel Ockenfels and Wilhelm Hofmann

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2016, vol. 56, issue C, 107-115

Abstract: Using data from a large representative US sample (N=1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values.

Keywords: Fairness; Morality; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:56:y:2016:i:c:p:107-115

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2016.06.004

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