The Fragility of a Nudge: the power of self-set norms to contain a social dilemma

Christoph Engel and Michael Kurschilgen

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2020, vol. 81, issue C

Abstract: Can self-set normative goals restrain free-riding in a social dilemma? In a first experimental study, we test the effect of two different types of self-set normative goals on people’s willingness to cooperate in a public good game. Focusing on the level of contributions that one can at least be expected to make proves effective at restraining the material incentive to free-ride. Yet in two later studies, with only a minimal change in the wording of the goal, the effect does not replicate. The mental process is still present. But if the overall level of cooperation is higher, the effect is not strong enough to significantly increase contributions. The nudge does not work if the context is too cooperative in the first place.

Keywords: Social Dilemma; Identity; Norms; Goals; Experiment; Nudge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:81:y:2020:i:c:s0167487020300507

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102293

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