 Chess girls don’t cry: Gender composition of games and effort in competitions among the super-eliteJournal of Economic Psychology, 2022, vol. 89, issue C Abstract: The deterministic nature of chess makes the outcome strongly predictable, especially among the elite. As a result, instead of ending in a checkmate or a forced tie, elite chess games end either in the resignation of the player in a losing position or a mutually agreed upon draw. Traits such as competitiveness, over-confidence, and risk tolerance, all more prevalent among males, likely prolong the games. In contrast, susceptibility to intimidation and stereotype threat, more relevant to females, likely accelerate the completion of games. Using a recent sample of super-elite chess games, the present paper shows that males are substantially quicker to quit when dominated by a female than by a male. In contrast, female players’ behaviour differs little as a function of the gender of opponents. The results are interpreted through the “mere effort” impact of stereotype threat and the self-handicapping concept. Keywords: Gender; Chess; Competitiveness; Effort; Stereotype threat; Self-handicapping (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:89:y:2022:i:c:s0167487022000010 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102482 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Psychology is currently edited by G. Antonides and D. Read More articles in Journal of Economic Psychology from Elsevier |
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