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Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

Zong-Hong Cao, Yong-Wu Zhou, Ju Zhao and Chang-Wen Li

Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 2015, vol. 26, issue C, 1-13

Abstract: This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.

Keywords: Supply chain management; Value-added service; Entry; Profit-sharing contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jretconser.2015.04.005

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