An Incomplete Contracting Model of Dual Distribution in Franchising

George Hendrikse and Tao Jiang

Journal of Retailing, 2011, vol. 87, issue 3, 332-344

Abstract: Dual distribution in franchising is addressed from an incomplete contracting perspective. We explicitly model cooperative (dual distribution) franchising as an organizational form, next to wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, and dual distribution franchise systems. Key conclusions of the model are: (1) dual distribution as an efficient governance mechanism does not depend on heterogeneous downstream outlets, and (2) whether dual distribution or some other organizational form is efficient depends on the size of the benefits to dual distribution relative to the parties’ costs of investing.

Keywords: Franchising; Dual distribution; Cooperative franchising; Incomplete contracting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jouret:v:87:y:2011:i:3:p:332-344

DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2011.01.003

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