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Satisfaction and preferences in a legality social dilemma: Does corporate social responsibility impact consumers’ behaviour?

Leonardo Becchetti (), Germana Corrado (), Vittorio Pelligra and Fiammetta Rossetti

Journal of Policy Modeling, 2020, vol. 42, issue 2, 483-502

Abstract: We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma by comparing results from satisfaction-based and a choice-based approach by means of a laboratory experiment. The experimental design tests the effects of the legality rating frame on consumers’ choice between products from producers labeled by the legality rating and products by unlabeled producers. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The empirical findings support the hypothesis of our theoretical model that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design.

Keywords: Analysis of collective decision-making; Laboratory experiment; Legality game; Corporate social responsibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D73 C92 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:42:y:2020:i:2:p:483-502

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.07.003

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