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(When) Do hub airlines internalize their self-imposed congestion delays?

Joseph Daniel and Katherine Thomas Harback

Journal of Urban Economics, 2008, vol. 63, issue 2, 583-612

Abstract: Specification tests using stochastic bottleneck models of airport congestion investigate whether dominant airlines internalize or ignore self-imposed delays at twenty-seven major US airports. Data on flight times determine the airport's landing and takeoff delays for every minute of operation during peak travel days. Dynamic congestion functions based on stochastic-queuing theory separately identify delays that aircraft experience directly, impose internally on their airline's other aircraft, or impose externally on other airlines. Specification tests largely reject internalization and fail to reject non-internalization by dominant airlines. Optimal pricing should value all time using non-dominant aircraft time values and treat all delays as external.

Keywords: Airport; congestion; pricing; Stochastic; queuing; Bottleneck; model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

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Working Paper: (When) Do Hub Airlines Internalize Their Self-Imposed Congestion Delays? (2005) Downloads
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