The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: Evidence from a field experiment

John Micklewright () and Gyula Nagy

Labour Economics, 2010, vol. 17, issue 1, 180-187

Abstract: Programme administration is a relatively neglected issue in the analysis of disincentive effects of unemployment benefit systems. We investigate this issue with a field experiment in Hungary involving random assignment of benefit claimants to treatment and control groups. Treatment increases the monitoring of claims -- claimants make more frequent visits to the employment office and face questioning about their search behaviour. Treatment has quite a large effect on durations on benefit of women aged 30 and over, while we find no effect for younger women or men.

Keywords: Field; experiment; Monitoring; Job; search; Unemployment; insurance; Hungary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927-5371(09)00113-4
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: evidence from a field experiment (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:180-187

Access Statistics for this article

Labour Economics is currently edited by A. Ichino

More articles in Labour Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().