Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain

Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz

Labour Economics, 2012, vol. 19, issue 3, 403-426

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the unemployment insurance system and labour market turnover. This study assumes the incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance system have a heterogeneous impact, depending on the type of labour market transition (quits versus layoffs and recalls versus new job entrances) and on a worker's attachment to the labour market (gender and type of contract). The layoff hazard rate increases as workers qualify for unemployment benefits, whilst the quit hazard rate remains stable. Similarly, employment inflow increases sharply after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. The timing and importance of the exit differ between recalls and new job entry and depend on a worker's attachment to the labour market. The results show that unemployment benefits appear to favour job turnover and both firms' and workers' decisions seem to matter.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Job turnover; Multivariate mix proportional hazard models; Recall and layoffs; Temporary dismissals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

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Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance and Job Turnover in Spain (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:3:p:403-426

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2012.02.008

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