Job search incentives and job match quality

Simen Gaure, Knut Røed () and Lars Westlie

Labour Economics, 2012, vol. 19, issue 3, 438-450

Abstract: We examine the impacts of time-limited unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) on the duration and outcome of job search in Norway. We use a comprehensive simultaneous equations model accounting for i) the duration of unemployment spells; ii) their outcomes, iii) subsequent employment stability; and iv) the earnings level associated with the first job. We find that time invested in job search pays off in form of higher earnings once a job match is formed. ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job as well as expected earnings, but at the cost of lengthening job search.

Keywords: Multivariate hazards; Job search; Job quality; Timing-of-events; NPMLE; MMPH (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C15 C41 J64 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:3:p:438-450

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2012.04.001

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