Nash bargaining and the wage consequences of educational mismatches
Michael Sattinger and
Joop Hartog
Labour Economics, 2013, vol. 23, issue C, 50-56
Abstract:
The paper provides a theoretical foundation for the empirical regularities observed in estimations of wage consequences of overeducation and undereducation. Workers with more education than required for their jobs are observed to suffer wage penalties relative to workers with the same education in jobs that require their educational level. Similarly, workers with less education than required for their jobs earn wage rewards. These departures from the Mincer human capital earnings function can be explained by Nash bargaining between workers and employers. Under fairly mild assumptions, Nash bargaining predicts a wage penalty for overeducation and a wage reward for undereducation. This paper reviews the established empirical regularities and then provides Nash bargaining results that explain these regularities.
Keywords: Overeducation; Undereducation; Nash bargaining; Qualitative mismatches; Mincer earnings function; Wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C78 J24 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537113000298
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Nash Bargaining and the Wage Consequences of Educational Mismatches (2012) 
Working Paper: Nash Bargaining and the Wage Consequences of Educational Mismatches (2012) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:23:y:2013:i:c:p:50-56
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2013.03.002
Access Statistics for this article
Labour Economics is currently edited by A. Ichino
More articles in Labour Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().