Relative consumption, working time, and trade unions

Laszlo Goerke and Inga Hillesheim

Labour Economics, 2013, vol. 24, issue C, 170-179

Abstract: Status considerations with respect to consumption give rise to negative externalities because individuals do not take into account that their decisions affect the relative consumption position of others. Further, status concerns create incentives for excessive labour supply in competitive markets. We show that trade unions which are unable to internalise the externality can nevertheless mitigate the resulting distortion. The reason is that wages above the market clearing level are only feasible if people work less and, therefore, fewer hours than in a competitive market. Accordingly, the theoretical model establishes that trade unions can have a welfare-enhancing role in a world with relative consumption effects.

Keywords: Externality; Hours of work; Relative consumption; Trade union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D J (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Relative Consumption, Working Time, and Trade Unions (2013)
Working Paper: Relative Consumption, Working Time, and Trade Unions (2013)
Working Paper: Relative Consumption, Working Time, and Trade Unions (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:24:y:2013:i:c:p:170-179

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2013.08.002

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