Salary History Bans and Wage Bargaining: Experimental Evidence
Shantanu Khanna ()
Labour Economics, 2020, vol. 65, issue C
Motivated by recently passed laws in the United States banning inquiries about salary history, this experiment examines the impact of information about a player’s outside option in bargaining. The policy intention is studied by comparing private information to perfect information. Since the laws do not prevent voluntary revelation of salaries, a third treatment examines the impact of adding a truthful revelation choice by the informed party. I find that the signaling value of revelation decisions undermines the benefits of private information. A fourth treatment allows for outside options to be misrepresented. Overall, results suggest that these laws may not work as well as intended.
Keywords: Labor Discrimination; Public Policy; Experimental Bargaining; Ultimatum Game; Cheap Talk; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 J38 J78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:65:y:2020:i:c:s0927537120300579
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