Peer effects in the decision to apply for a professional excellence award

Samuel Berlinski and Alejandra Ramos

Labour Economics, 2020, vol. 67, issue C

Abstract: We study the role social interactions at the workplace play in the decision to apply for a professional recognition program. In Chile, teachers can apply to a pedagogical excellence award. Successful applicants receive a wage increase and are publicly recognized. We exploit the quasi-random variation in the allocation of awards generated by a sharp assignment rule. We document that the success of an applicant increases her school colleagues’ application rate to the program by almost 75%. The impact is higher for colleagues with closer interaction with a successful applicant. We speculate on social learning as a driver of this result.

Keywords: Merit award; Public recognition; Peer effects; Social learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 J58 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Peer Effects in the Decision to Apply for a Professional Excellence Award (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:67:y:2020:i:c:s092753712030138x

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101934

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