Design principles for individual transferable quotas

Ralph E. Townsend, James McColl and Michael Young

Marine Policy, 2006, vol. 30, issue 2, 131-141

Abstract: Individual transferable quota (ITQ) institutions should be designed to minimize two types of transaction costs. First, to minimize the costs of transferring ITQ rights among rights-holders and users, rights should be separated into three components: a permanent entitlement share, an annual catch allocation, and a license to fish. Second, ITQ rights can reduce the transactions costs for development of self-governance by owners both by specifying a non-unanimous voting rule (preferably one-share/one-vote) and also by delineating clear standards for devolution of responsibility from government. These same two principles for reduction of transactions costs can be applied, with slight variation, to individual transferable input systems.

Keywords: Fisheries; management; Individual; transferable; quotas; Transactions; costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Design principles for individual transferable quotas (2004)
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