Design principles for individual transferable quotas

Michael Young and Jim McColl ()

Natural Resource Management Economics from Policy and Economic Research Unit, CSIRO Land and Water, Adelaide, Australia

Abstract: Individual transferable quote (ITQ) institutions should be designed to minimize two types of transaction costs.

Keywords: Fisheries management; individual transferable quotas; transactions costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q0 Q1 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
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Related works:
Journal Article: Design principles for individual transferable quotas (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csi:report:04_004

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