Comparison of simultaneous and combinatorial auction designs in fisheries quota market

Md Sayed Iftekhar and John Tisdell

Marine Policy, 2012, vol. 36, issue 2, 446-453

Abstract: Individual transferable quota (ITQ) markets are being used successfully to distribute quotas in single region and single species fisheries. In many parts of the world, the development of well crafted markets for multispecies or multiregional fisheries is still evolving. As a result, there exists an opportunity to inform policy by providing research insights into the relative merits of alternative market designs for such fisheries.

Keywords: Combinatorial auction; Degree of competition; Economies of Scope; Economies of Scale; ITQs; Simultaneous auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:36:y:2012:i:2:p:446-453

DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2011.08.007

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