Fisheries quota allocation: Laboratory experiments on simultaneous and combinatorial auctions

John Tisdell and Md Sayed Iftekhar

Marine Policy, 2013, vol. 38, issue C, 228-234

Abstract: Markets for individual tradeable fishing quota are evolving and maturing in many countries throughout the world. Synergies in spatial and temporal packages of fishing quotas have yet to be explored and exploited. The relative performance of simultaneous multi-round and combinatorial auctions has been well documented and explored in a number of environments including the allocation of spectrum rights by the US Federal Communications Commission, aircraft take-off and landing slots, as well as pollution emissions allowances. It is therefore timely and policy relevant to explore the relative performance of simultaneous and combinatorial fishery quota markets in controlled experimental environments. This paper reports the results of a series of economic experiments exploring the relative merits of these alternative fishing quota markets. The results provide important insights into the future development of individual tradeable fishing quotas.

Keywords: Combinatorial auction; ITQs; Simultaneous auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:38:y:2013:i:c:p:228-234

DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.039

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