Price collusion and deregulation in the Japanese retail gasoline market
Ujo Goto and
Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), 2002, vol. 59, issue 1, 187-195
This paper estimates models for the retail price of gasoline in Tokyo and Osaka based on recent game theory emphasizing the importance of forward-looking behaviour by firms. Using monthly data for the 1990s, this paper presents evidence consistent with the theory that future changes in the economic environment firms face do have an impact on the current retail price of gasoline. Some evidence is also presented that suggests the behaviour of retail prices has changed over the time period being examined.
Keywords: Collusion; Deregulation; Game theory; Gasoline; Pricing behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matcom:v:59:y:2002:i:1:p:187-195
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