 A dynamic model of oligopoly with R&D externalities along networks. Part IIGian Italo Bischi and Fabio Lamantia Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), 2012, vol. 84, issue C, 66-82 Abstract: In Bischi and Lamantia [4] a two-stage oligopoly game has been proposed to describe networks of firms that invest in cost-reducing R&D activity with the possibility of sharing R&D results with partner firms as well as gaining knowledge for free through spillovers, and an adaptive dynamic mechanism is proposed to describe how firms repeatedly update their R&D efforts over time. In that paper existence and stability of equilibria have been analyzed given a fixed structure of the collaboration network, divided into sub-networks. In this paper we analyze the influences of the degree of collaboration and spillovers on profits, social welfare and, more generally, on overall efficiency. We first consider two relevant benchmark cases, for which analytical results are provided, and then numerical experiments are performed to stress the role of the level of connectivity (i.e. the collaboration attitude) inside networks as well as the effects of involuntary knowledge spillovers inside each network and among different competing networks. Keywords: R&D cooperation; Networks; Repeated games; Knowledge spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matcom:v:84:y:2012:i:c:p:66-82 DOI: 10.1016/j.matcom.2012.09.001 Access Statistics for this article Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM) is currently edited by Robert Beauwens More articles in Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM) from Elsevier |
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