Ordinal status games on networks

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 100, issue C

Abstract: We consider a modification of ordinal status games of Haagsma and von Mouche (2010). A number of agents make scalar choices, e.g., their levels of conspicuous consumption. The wellbeing of each agent depends on her own choice and on her social status determined by comparisons with the choices of others. In contrast to the original model, as well as its modifications considered so far, we allow for some players not caring about comparisons with some others. Assuming that the status of each player may only be “high” or “low,” the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium is shown; for a particular subclass of such games, the convergence of Cournot tatonnement is established. If more than two possible status levels are allowed into consideration, then even Nash equilibrium may fail to exist in very simple examples.

Keywords: Status game; Strong equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; Cournot tatonnement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Ordinal status games on networks (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:100:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000118

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102647

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