Learning to agree over large state spaces

Michele Crescenzi

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 100, issue C

Abstract: We study how a consensus emerges in a finite population of like-minded individuals who are asymmetrically informed about the realization of the true state of the world. Agents observe a private signal about the state and then start exchanging messages. Generalizing the classical model of rational dialogues of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and its subsequent extensions, we dispense with the standard assumption that the state space is a probability space and we do not put any bound on the cardinality of the state space itself or the information partitions. We show that a class of rational dialogues can be found that always lead to consensus provided that three main conditions are met. First, everybody must be able to send messages to everybody else, either directly or indirectly. Second, communication must be reciprocal. Finally, agents need to have the opportunity to engage in dialogues of transfinite length.

Keywords: Agreement theorem; Common knowledge; Consensus; Learning; Rational dialogue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:100:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000155

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102654

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