Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

Shuhei Morimoto

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 102, issue C

Abstract: We study probabilistic voting rules in the case where agents have single-peaked preferences over alternatives. A probabilistic rule decides a probability distribution over the set of alternatives for each profile of agents’ preferences. In this paper, we characterize the class of group strategy-proof and peak-only probabilistic rules.

Keywords: Group strategy-proofness; Probabilistic rule; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:102:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000842

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102755

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