A new impossibility result for random assignments

Mehdi Feizi and Rasoul Ramezanian

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023, vol. 107, issue C

Abstract: We know that ex-post Pareto efficiency is possible with strategy-proofness and weak envy-freeness while ordinally efficiency is incompatible with them. We strengthen this impossibility for random assignments and show that it prevails if ordinal efficiency is weakened to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency, an intermediate notion of efficiency weaker than ordinal efficiency and stronger than ex-post Pareto efficiency. An assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for all of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient.

Keywords: Random assignment problem; Robust ex-post pareto efficiency; Weak envy-freeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406823000435
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:107:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000435

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102850

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().