Stable and meta-stable contract networks

Vladimir I. Danilov and Alexander Karzanov

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023, vol. 108, issue C

Abstract: This paper studies a multilateral matching market in which each participant can sign contracts with any other agents. This market subsumes the two-sided matching and the roommate problem as special cases. We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices i∈I are interpreted as agents, and the edges c∈C as contracts that can be concluded between agents. The preferences of each agent i are given by a choice functionfi possessing the so-called path independent property. In this general setup we consider the notion of stable contract network.

Keywords: Plott choice functions; Aizerman–Malishevski theorem; Stable marriage; Hypergraph; Roommate problem; Scarf lemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stable and metastable contract networks (2023)
Working Paper: Stable and metastable contract networks (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:108:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000812

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102888

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