Transitions between equilibria in Bilingual Games under Probit Choice

Srinivas Arigapudi

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 111, issue C

Abstract: We study the effect of introducing a bilingual strategy on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria under the probit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the probit choice rule.

Keywords: Coordination games; Bilingual games; Probit choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000181
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:111:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000181

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102956

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().