“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots

Françoise Forges and Indrajit Ray ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 114, issue C

Abstract: The very first paper published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics, “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”, by Aumann, proposes a new approach to strategic form games by taking account of an extraneous space of states of the world, on which every player has a subjective probability distribution and private information. We review some of Aumann’s results as well as some properties and extensions of the best known by-product of his seminal paper, the “correlated equilibrium”.

Keywords: Communication equilibrium; Correlated equilibrium; Experiment; Multistage game; Pure strategy equilibrium; Recommendation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001046

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044

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