Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules

Steven Kivinen

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 115, issue C

Abstract: In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called equity. As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.

Keywords: Voting; Equity; Anonymity; Neutrality; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001216
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:115:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001216

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().