Nash oligarchies

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2025, vol. 117, issue C

Abstract: A bargaining solution is a Nash oligarchy if there exists a set of players O, the oligarchy, such that in every bargaining problem every player outside O is allocated his disagreement payoff, and the oligarchs share the surplus according to the |O|-person Nash solution. The Nash bargaining solution corresponds to the case where O contains all players, and dictatorial solutions correspond to singleton Os. I show that a solution satisfies three standard axioms together with a condition that balances utilitarianism and egalitarianism if and only if it is a Nash oligarchy. Strengthening the condition implies that the oligarchy contains at most two players. Strengthening it further implies a dictatorship.

Keywords: Bargaining; Egalitarianism; Nash solution; Oligarchies; Utilitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:117:y:2025:i:c:s0304406825000102

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103093

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